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ABSTRACT
Estonia’s path towards a market economy started in 1987, when Gorbachev’s mar-
ket-oriented reform course allowed for an unprecedented level of autonomous 
cooperation with capitalist countries. The developing networks with Western 
companies and economists, in particular from the neutral Nordic neighbours 
Finland and Sweden, played a key role in the process of implementing an in-
creasingly radical pro-market agenda. Unrestricted by diplomatic constraints, 
Swedish and Finnish entrepreneurs, investors and advisors established numer-
ous links to the evolving Estonian business environment, which was promot-
ed as a bridge to the vast Soviet market. The Nordic connection facilitated the 
early transfer of market economy thinking and practices to Soviet Estonia and 
kicked off a long-term rearrangement of economic linkages across the Baltic 
Sea. Taking into account this transnational cooperation contributes to a new 
understanding not only of Estonia’s economic transformation, but also of the 
emergence of a new regional economic order that accompanied the geopolit-
ical changes.
Keywords: Soviet Estonian economy, perestroika, IME Proposal, market re-
forms, Swedish-Estonian relations, Finnish-Estonian relations
The so-called Four-Man Proposal, an appeal that promoted full economic 
autonomy as a viable option for the Estonian SSR published in the Tartu-
based daily Edasi on 26 September 1987, marked a watershed moment in the 
perestroika process.1 Drafted by an informal group of a dozen economists 
Earlier versions of this paper have been presented and discussed at the conference “The 
Great Transformation? Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold 
War” at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, 24–26 September 2015, and at a departmental 
colloquium at the Institute for East European History, University of Vienna, in January 
2016. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful input received by the conference participants 
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and planners, the proposal outlined a set of market-oriented reforms, call-
ing for a public debate on how to adapt Mikhail Gorbachev’s far-reaching 
economic reform agenda to local conditions. The document, which car-
ried the signatures of the main initiator Edgar Savisaar, employed at the 
time as department head at the Soviet Estonian State Planning Commit-
tee, the economists Siim Kallas and Tiit Made, and the sociologist Mikk 
Titma, introduced a ten-point programme aimed at diminishing the nega-
tive effects of overregulation on the republican economy.2 One of the key 
demands was the transfer of administrative and decision-making power 
over all industries in the territory of the Estonian SSR to the authorities in 
Tallinn. Moreover, all Soviet Estonian enterprises were supposed to operate 
according to the principles of self-financing and economic accountability. 
Trade between Estonia and other Soviet republics was to be based on free-
market principles, facilitated by the introduction of a convertible rouble. 
The same applied to Estonia’s developing autonomous business and trade 
relations with capitalist countries. As one of the signatories stressed, the 
latter aspect in particular was deemed crucial in view of potential direct 
investments from the West.3
By the time of the publication of the Four-Man Proposal, the political 
climate of the USSR had changed beyond recognition. Under the banner 
of perestroika, the Soviet leadership had introduced a number of radical 
market-oriented reforms expected to improve the efficiency and profitabil-
ity of the industrial and agricultural sectors. Semi-private entrepreneur-
ship, a taboo since the days of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, was de facto 
legalized by the Law on Individual Labour and the Law on Cooperatives, 
and my colleagues in Vienna and, in particular, the constructive and detailed feedback 
provided by Prof. Dr. Philipp Ther (Institute for East European History, University of 
Vienna), Dr. János Kóvacs (Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna) and the two anony-
mous reviewers. The research was supported by the Estonian Research Council through 
the European Social Fund (Mobilitas grant MJD347) and the Swedish Research Council 
(International Postdoc Programme).
1  “Ettepanek: Kogu Eesti NSV täielikule isemajandamisele”, Edasi, 26 September 1987. 
The term isemajandamine is usually translated as “economic autonomy” but as Erik 
Terk points out, it could also mean “economic independence”. Erik Terk, Privatisation in 
Estonia: ideas, processes, results (Tallinn: Estonian Institute for Futures Studies, 2000), 23. 
2  Titma was not involved in the preparations of the draft, but agreed to sign the docu-
ment. At the time of the appeal’s publication, some of the members of the informal 
expert group were away on official trips, while others refrained from publically exposing 
their participation in the initiative, fearing political repercussions. Marika Lillemets, 
“Indrek Toome – igal ajal esimene”, Eesti ettevõtluse taassünd, 1987–1991, ed. by Marina 
Kaas and Kersti Kraas (Tallinn: TEA, 2009), 12–13 (13). 
3  Interview with Tiit Made, Tallinn, 6 February 2015, in author’s possession. 
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adopted in 1985 and 1986. The Decree on Joint Ventures, issued by the USSR 
Council of Ministers in January 1987, opened up the rather closed domestic 
market to Western investments, giving an additional impetus to the mar-
ketization of the Soviet economy. Against this backdrop, the proposal of 
the Estonian reformers fell in line with the ongoing Union-wide debates 
about necessary systemic changes that had been triggered by glasnost. The 
demand for republican autonomy was indeed a novelty in the USSR, but 
could be backed up by earlier criticism of Soviet economic centralism voiced 
by prominent scholars such as Abel Aganbegyan and Tatyana Zaslavskaya, 
both of whom counted among Gorbachev’s closest economic advisors.4
According to historian and former Prime Minister Mart Laar, it was 
the first large-scale demonstration against the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 
in Tallinn’s Hirvepark in August 1987 that emboldened the small group of 
planning officials and economists to publicly call for Estonia’s economic 
autonomy.5 Other contemporary observers, by contrast, interpreted the 
Four-Man Proposal rather as a well-calculated manoeuvre to counterbal-
ance the increasingly radical rhetoric of the nationalist opposition.6 Indeed, 
the proposal played a seminal role in the evolution of the programmatic 
agenda of the Popular Front (Rahvarinne), which “to a great extent [was] 
a movement for the fulfilment of the IME project”, as the idea of full eco-
nomic autonomy was labelled at the time.7 The Popular Front promoted 
an alternative vision of Estonia’s nearest future, focusing on a path of sys-
temic reform within the USSR that starkly contrasted with the maximal-
ist agenda of secession, mainly represented by the Congress of Estonia, the 
political platform of the pronouncedly anti-Soviet faction. The evolution of 
the secessionist course from the first demands for greater political autonomy 
to the restoration of independence has been widely covered, but scholarly 
research has paid much less attention to the concept of economic auton-
omy. This neglect is surprising, as the lively public debates on economic 
decentralization and marketization significantly contributed to delegiti-
mizing Soviet rule in the Estonian SSR. Moreover, the quick implementa-
tion of radical market reforms from 1988 onwards kicked off embryonic 
4  Toivo Miljan, “The proposal to establish economic autonomy in Estonia”, Journal of 
Baltic Studies, 20:2 (1989), 149–64 (154). 
5  Mart Laar, “Suurte muutuste aeg, 1987–1991”, Eesti ettevõtluse taassünd, 7–9 (8).
6  Rein Taagepera, “Estonia’s road to independence”, Problems of Communism, 38:6 
(1989), 11–26 (16); Viktor Niitsoo, “Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei tegevus aastail 
1988–1991, I”, Akadeemia, 12 (2000), 246–68 (247). 
7  Terk, Privatisation in Estonia, 23. IME, short for “Self-managing Estonia” (Isemajandav 
Eesti), also means “miracle” in Estonian.
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processes of economic transformation that ultimately had a crucial impact 
on Estonia’s post-1991 economic performance.
Estonia’s rapid and relatively smooth transition towards a market-driven 
economy and the broad popular support for radical economic reforms 
have often been explained with reference to historic and cultural peculi-
arities. Still-living memories of the pre-war economy were doubtlessly an 
important factor that distinguished Estonians and their Baltic neighbours 
from the inhabitants of the Soviet heartland. Another frequently offered 
explanation refers to the Weberian connection between Protestant eth-
ics and the spirit of capitalism, linking the country’s Lutheran heritage to 
the dynamic evolution of private entrepreneurship in late Soviet Estonia.8 
Moreover, the thriving black market of Tallinn, a popular destination for 
Western visitors to the USSR from the mid-1960s onwards, is still present 
in Estonian collective memory as a kind of informal business school that 
brought up a first generation of entrepreneurs.9 All these factors certainly 
mattered in rooting market economy thinking and practices in Estonia, 
although their impact is hard to measure. A much less discussed aspect of 
the Estonian path of transition, however, relates to the significance of early 
forms of cooperation between economic decision-makers in the Estonian 
SSR and investors and economic experts in capitalist countries.
The decentralization of the Soviet economy and the liberalization of the 
border regime created unprecedented opportunities for individual Soviet 
republics to establish autonomous business and trade relations with the 
West, and Estonia quickly became an uncontested pioneer in this field. 
Direct communication with Western investors and trade partners and 
regular consultation with foreign experts and advisors fostered the devel-
opment of a thriving informal network with major nodes in both West-
ern Europe and North America, offering Estonia’s economic elites and a 
first generation of de facto private entrepreneurs a potpourri of different 
variants of market economy thinking. Due to the republic’s geographic 
location and the close cultural and historical bonds to Northern Europe, 
however, the fundamental principles of Western economic thought and 
practices reached Estonia mainly via Finland and Sweden. Although the 
post-Soviet Estonian governments eventually rejected the Nordic model 
of a social market economy, the connection to the Nordic neighbour states 
8  The asserted “Lutheran work ethic” was a factor used to promote Western direct 
investments in Estonia already in the late 1980s. See, for example, Richard Gwyn, “Baltic 
state sings a song of freedom”, Toronto Star, 24 September 1989.
9  Jaak Leimann, “Mälestuskilde ettevõtluse ajaloost”, Eesti ettevõtluse taassünd, 16–17 
(16).
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had a long-lasting impact on the earliest phase of Estonia’s economic trans-
formation during the late perestroika era. 
This essay aims to explore the entanglements between Soviet Estonia’s 
nascent business environment and the economies of the neutral Nordic 
states, adding a new dimension to the broad range of previous studies on 
Swedish and Finnish policies vis-à-vis the Baltic republics in the crucial 
period between 1987 and 1991. In the literature, Iceland and Denmark usu-
ally stand out as “keen advocates of the Baltic republics”, while the remain-
ing Nordic countries, especially Finland, are commonly portrayed as cau-
tious and less supportive of Baltic claims to independence.10 The focus on 
personal and professional economic networks between Estonian key play-
ers and their Nordic partners poses a more nuanced reading of the Swedish 
and Finnish stance towards Estonia’s increasingly emancipatory course. In 
the midst of the so-called Singing Revolution, the governments in Stock-
holm and Helsinki indeed refrained from official communication with the 
anti-Soviet leadership of the secessionist camp, especially with regard to 
their diplomatic relations with Moscow.11 Mid- and grassroots-level sup-
port of the economic reform process, by contrast, was, as will be shown, 
deemed much less controversial at the time.  
Focusing on Estonian planning officials, economists and consultants, 
this essay explores the historic significance of the numerous cogs in the 
Soviet state institutions, agents who, according to Stephen Kotkin, played 
a more decisive role than the anti-communist opposition in bringing down 
the system.12 The reconstruction of transnational elite networks is, however, 
not an easy task. In small and relatively isolated societies such as Soviet 
Estonia, networks generally developed in a highly informal way, leaving 
10  Kristina Spohr Readman, “International reactions to Soviet disintegration”, Europe 
and the end of the Cold War: a reappraisal, ed. by Frédéric Bozo et al. (London: Rout-
ledge, 2008), 220–232 (224).
11  The Finnish government’s obvious reluctance to support the Baltic independence 
movements was rooted in the specificity of Helsinki’s neutrality policy, which, due to 
numerous concessions to the Soviet Union throughout the post-war decades, gener-
ated the derogatory term “Finlandization”. However, even the Swedish government 
displayed a sceptical attitude towards the idea of Baltic secession, a phenomenon that 
has been comprehensively described in the autobiographical accounts of two Swedish 
diplomats engaged in Baltic issues in the late 1980s, see Dag Sebastian Ahlander, Spelet 
om Baltikum (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1992); Lars Peter Fredén, Förvandlingar: Baltikums 
frigörelse och svensk diplomati 1989–1991 (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2004).
12  Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil society: 1989 and the implosion of the Communist establish-
ment (New York: Modern Library, 2009).
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few documented traces.13 Nevertheless, the available source material made 
it possible to get a glimpse of the bigger picture. A first series of semi-struc-
tured oral history interviews with key players among the economic elite 
of perestroika-era Estonia offered useful background information about 
early networking processes with Nordic partners. Further interviews and 
personal reminiscences have been published in a number of non-scholarly 
volumes on the economic history of late-Soviet Estonia, released on the 
Estonian book market in recent years.14 Despite the subjectivity of most 
accounts, they give a general idea about the remarkable dynamics of mar-
ketization in the Estonian SSR. Other important primary sources included 
expert analyses, programmatic writings and official reports, some of which 
have been published, while others were retrieved from the archival collec-
tions stored at the Museum of Estonians Abroad in Toronto and the Labour 
Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm. Also the Estonian press of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s provided interesting information. Äripäev 
in particular, founded as a Swedish-Estonian joint venture and one of the 
first Soviet business newspapers outside Moscow in 1989, turned out to 
be a useful source for the reconstruction of the various forms of informal 
cooperation between Estonia and the Nordic states in the economic sphere. 
The IME process: self-managing Estonia and the spirit of economic 
reform
By the time Gorbachev entered office as General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party in March 1985, the ruling elites in the Kremlin were 
already highly aware of the existential challenges posed by the superpow-
er’s flagging economy. The gross inefficiency of central planning strained 
the state budget to a much greater extent than the tremendous defence 
expenses and the subsidies for the satellite states.15 Ever since the founda-
tion of the Soviet Union, its leaders had been confronted with the inherent 
flaws of the command economy system. Hence, the economic history of the 
Soviet Union features a variety of attempts to balance the dysfunctional 
13  Li Bennich-Björkman, “The cultural roots of Estonia’s successful transition: how 
historical legacies shaped the 1990s”, East European Politics and Societies, 21:2 (2007), 
316–347 (320).  
14  See, for example, Kaas and Kraas, Eesti ettevõtluse taassünd; Mati Laos, Mainori lugu 
(Tallinn: Mainor, 2014); Jäljed. Meenutusi täiskasvanuhariduse lähiajaloost Eestis, ed. 
by Marika Seppius (Tallinn: SE&JS, 2000). 
15  Andrew Bennet, “The guns that didn’t smoke: ideas and the Soviet non-use of force 
in 1989”, Journal of Cold War Studies, 7:2 (2005), 81–109 (100). 
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system of production and distribution. Gorbachev was thus not the first 
Soviet leader to realize the urgent need to modify the economic policies 
of the USSR. However, due to his exceptional willingness to challenge 
ideological dogmas and to address the core of the Soviet Union’s miser-
able economic performance, his pragmatic approach to solving structural 
problems radically differed from the measures applied by his predecessors.
The roots of Gorbachev’s reform agenda reach back to the mid-1960s 
when the Soviet leadership started experimenting with decentralizing 
the industrial sector in order to improve its efficiency and profitability. 
Although the so-called Kosygin reforms eventually failed to reach the pro-
claimed goals due to considerable resistance among the Party nomenklat-
ura, their implicit criticism of central planning had a long-lasting impact 
on economic thinking in the USSR. A new generation of economists devel-
oped a strongly critical stance towards the “extreme centralism” and the 
“lack of democracy in economic matters”, as was stated in a report com-
piled by the Siberian Institute of Economics in Novosibirsk, the flagship of 
reform-oriented economic thought.16 The analyses of the reformist faction 
of Soviet economists made a deep impression on Gorbachev already dur-
ing his time as a Party bureaucrat in Stavropol. Their impact on his take 
on economic issues was reflected in his programmatic speech at the 27th 
Party Congress in February 1986, during which the new Soviet leader called 
for a bolder course of marketization and an agenda of “radical economic 
reform”.17 It was thus a combination of economic pressure and new cur-
rents in the field of economics that lay behind the drafting of the market-
oriented reform programme which became the main pillar of perestroika.
The repercussions of the new reformist fervour could be felt across the 
USSR, especially in the Baltic republics where salaries and living standards 
were above the Soviet average. Since the late 1950s, the small republics at 
the western Soviet periphery had been among Moscow’s favourite settings 
for economic reforms. The northernmost of the Baltic republics in particu-
lar had acquired the status of pioneer in the field of experimental marketi-
zation, bringing “Soviet Estonia and her enterprise sector slightly closer 
to the market economy mechanism than other Soviet republics”.18 A pilot 
project in the Estonian light industry sector had just been completed when 
16  Qtd. in Toivo Miljan, “Perestroika: an interim review of its objectives, programs and 
prospects”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 20:2 (1989), 109–126 (111).  
17  Anders Åslund, Gorbachev’s struggle for economic reform (London: Pinter Publish-
ers, 1991), 26.
18  Kari Liuhto, “Entrepreneurial transition in post-Soviet republics: the Estonian path”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 48 (1996), 121–140 (121). 
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Gorbachev came to power. In line with Yuri Andropov’s “demands for a 
perfection of economic management”,19 the decisional autonomy of leading 
managers employed at republican light industry enterprises significantly 
increased and a certain degree of self-financing was introduced. The out-
come of the experiment was satisfactory and paved the way for additional 
innovative reform projects implemented on the republican level. With the 
establishment of the foreign trade association Estimpeks in March 1987, 
which allowed the republican government in Tallinn to coordinate its own 
imports and exports in specific branches, Estonia became the first Soviet 
republic to act independently from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade in 
Moscow.20 Also on the grassroots level, the pioneering role of the Estonian 
SSR as a hotspot of economic innovation was undisputed. A nascent boom 
of de facto private entrepreneurial activities could be observed throughout 
the Soviet Union, but already by mid-1987, Estonia topped the list with far 
more registered cooperatives per capita than any other Soviet republic.21 
However, the first steps towards a gradual marketization of the Soviet 
economy were not uncontested. Especially in the Russian SFSR and parts 
of the Ukrainian SSR, popular resistance against the emerging class of 
private entrepreneurs gave a new impetus to anti-capitalist sentiments.22 
Similar attitudes prevailed among the masses of Estonia and Latvia’s Rus-
sian-speaking industrial workers and leading managers at state enterprises, 
most of which were subordinated to all-Union ministries. The autoch-
thonous population of the Baltic republics, by contrast, largely supported 
the central government’s reform course, demanding increasingly radical 
steps. Gorbachev’s ambition to fundamentally reform the Soviet political 
and economic system had triggered a “revolution of rising expectations”,23 
encouraging not only oppositional forces, but also bureaucratic cadres and 
parts of the nomenklatura to publicly discuss the shortcomings of the sta-
tus quo. In the Estonian SSR, glasnost and its promises of transparency and 
19  Åslund, Gorbachev’s struggle for economic reform, 91.
20  Raivo Vare, “Majandusreformid 1990–1992: subjektiivsed teesid”, Majandusreformid: 
taasiseseisvunud Eesti esimese valitsuse aeg 1990–1992 (Tallinn: Majandus- ja Kom-
munikatsiooniministeerium, 2006), 21–25 (21); Mehis Pilv, “Eesti Riikliku Välisma-
jandusameti kujundamisest ja Eesti välismajanduse reformidest aastatel 1990–1992”, 
Majandusreformid, 47–49 (47). 
21  While in July 1987, the Soviet average featured one cooperative per 80,000 inhabitants, 
Estonia had one cooperative per 20,000 people. Liuhto, “Entrepreneurial transition in 
post-Soviet republics”, 122. 
22  Åslund, Gorbachev’s struggle for economic reform, 172–174.
23  Archie Brown, “Perestroika and the end of the Cold War”, Cold War History, 7:1 
(2007), 1–17 (12).  
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openness triggered a critical public debate on controversial issues such as 
the heavy environmental pollution caused by expansive, centrally admin-
istered industries and the uncontrolled influx of a Russian-speaking labour 
force. The highly politically charged debates all arrived at a similar con-
clusion, pointing out Estonia’s lack of autonomy in political and economic 
issues as the root of the shortcomings of the system itself.
The Four-Man Proposal of September 1987 was thus a product of the 
prevailing spirit of the time and reflected Gorbachev’s vision of a society of 
active citizens participating in ongoing reform debates, not only, but par-
ticularly in the economic sphere.24 Most of the experts involved in drafting 
the appeal held leading positions at some of the key institutions of the Soviet 
Estonian economy: the State Planning Committee, the Estonian Manage-
ment Institute (Eesti NSV Rahvamajanduse Juhtivate Töötajate ja Spetsial-
istide Kvalifikatsiooni Tõstmise Instituut), responsible for the professional 
training of enterprise directors and managers, and Mainor, a development 
and consulting company subordinated to the republican Ministry of Light 
Industry that developed and promoted the idea of small enterprises in the 
USSR, thus becoming a forerunner of Soviet marketization. The institu-
tional background of the reformers lent considerable substance to the pro-
posed strategy of “re-establish[ing] the Estonian nation as master of the 
Estonian territory”, which soon became the topic of lively debates among 
leading economic experts of the Estonian SSR.25 The Four-Man Proposal 
and its vision of full economic autonomy quickly gained wide public sup-
port, not only among the scholarly and administrative elites. Local Party 
organizations backed up the proposed reform agenda, as did members of 
the cultural elite and numerous researchers and students at Estonia’s insti-
tutions of higher education. The promotion and popularization of the pro-
posal was reinforced by regular lectures on the topic organized throughout 
Estonia by the authors themselves, during which they discussed the possi-
ble implementation of the reforms with enterprise managers, students and 
work collectives.26 Hence, the initial efforts of the Estonian Communist 
Party’s Central Committee and the head of the State Planning Committee, 
Valeri Paulman, to smother any open debate by publicly denouncing both 
the proposal and its authors eventually came to nothing.
24  Stephen White, Gorbachev and after (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 31.
25  Miljan, “The proposal to establish economic autonomy in Estonia”, 151. Peremehetunne, 
roughly translated as the feeling of being the “master of one’s own house”, became a 
much-cited catchword in the Soviet Estonian press from early October 1987 onwards.
26  Interview with Made.
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The discourse about the idea of economic autonomy grew into a full-
scale public debate about Estonia’s economic future that engaged large seg-
ments of Soviet Estonian society. Newspapers and television broadcasts pro-
vided a forum for vivid discussions that spread to universities and research 
institutes, eventually forcing the republican leadership to take action. At the 
7th Plenary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party 
in December 1987, the Party’s First Secretary Karl Vaino stated that the 
vision of full economic autonomy by itself was generally acceptable from 
an ideological point of view. The Council of Ministers in Tallinn ultimately 
agreed to the suggestion of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR 
to establish a task force of economic experts in order to determine the fea-
sibility of the proposed reform agenda. The expert group, which operated 
under the roof of the Soviet Estonian State Planning Committee and the 
Academy of Sciences and was headed by economist Rein Otsason, started to 
assess the option of regional self-management. At least initially, the group 
carefully avoided the term “economic autonomy”, focusing mainly on the 
task of making the existing economic system more efficient.27 By contrast, 
competing think tanks including the so-called IME Council (IME Probl-
eemnõukogu), led by Edgar Savisaar, one of the signatories of the Four-Man 
Proposal, developed alternative, more radical models of an autonomous 
Estonian reform path towards a market-based economy.
With the establishment of the Estonian Popular Front in April 1988, 
which, again, was an initiative of Savisaar, the Estonian economic reform 
discourse reached a new level. In its founding charter, the Popular Front 
indeed expressed its full support for Gorbachev’s reform course in the 
framework of perestroika. Nevertheless, the document clearly stated that 
it was in the interest of “our country and people to proceed to the full eco-
nomic autonomy of Estonia”,28 a goal which, strictly speaking, could only 
be reached by granting the Estonian SSR political sovereignty. This ambi-
tion was backed up by the vast majority of Estonia’s population.29 By the 
summer of 1988, slogans like “We believe in IME”, “Made and Savisaar to 
the Central Committee”, and even “We demand independence for Estonia” 
were common during the many public protests taking place throughout 
27  Miljan, “The proposal to establish economic autonomy in Estonia”, 156–157. 
28  Eestimaa Rahvarinne (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1988), 19.
29  According to a survey conducted in March 1988, 80 percent of the population of the 
Estonian SSR supported the IME project. Rein Ruutsoo, Civil society and nation build-
ing in Estonia and the Baltic states: impact of traditions on mobilization and transition 
1986–2000 (Rovaniemi: Lapin Yliopisto, 2002), 210.
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the republic.30 Under the impact of the rapidly growing public support for 
full economic autonomy, the radical faction of reform economists got the 
upper hand. From mid-1988 onwards, several dozen economists worked, 
assisted by hundreds of experts in specialist fields, on drafting a compre-
hensive reform agenda under the roof of the IME Council, which demon-
stratively aligned itself with the political agenda of the Popular Front.31
In June 1988, Moscow eventually chose to replace hardliner Karl Vaino 
with Vaino Väljas who, after having been removed from his post in the 
Soviet Estonian Communist Party’s Central Committee apparatus due to 
alleged nationalist tendencies, had spent many years working as a Soviet 
diplomat in Venezuela and Nicaragua. In his first programmatic speech, 
the Estonian Communist Party’s new First Secretary declared his full com-
mitment to the cause of expanding Estonian economic autonomy within 
the USSR, turning the issue into one of the official objectives of the Party 
programme.32 With the appointment of Indrek Toome as Estonia’s Prime 
Minister, the key posts of republican leadership were entirely in the hands 
of the reform-oriented forces. In November 1988, the Supreme Soviet of 
Estonia adopted the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, 
which eventually created the legal basis for carrying out an autonomous 
reform agenda.33 The Toome government immediately started to formu-
late a plan for implementing far-reaching market reforms drawing on a 
first conceptual programme (IME kontseptsiooni projekt) drafted by the 
expert groups of the IME Council, which had been published in the same 
month. That was “hour zero” of Estonia’s independent reform path from 
a command economy dependent on and strictly controlled by Moscow to 
a market-based, autonomous republican economy.34 Early on in Toome’s 
time in office, his government adopted a range of new decrees and laws on 
the decentralization of industries and on the further development of pri-
vate entrepreneurship.35 Seen from a pan-Soviet perspective, the dynam-
ics unleashed in Estonia under the new political leadership were revolu-
tionary. With the decision to implement the idea of economic autonomy 
30  Karl Aun, “Perestroika ja Eesti”, Meie Elu, 11 August 1988. 
31  Kersten Saar, “Iseolemise meeletu vaev”, Kesknädal, 24 February 2010, <http://www.
kesknadal.ee/g2/uudised?id=14163> (accessed 8 June 2016). 
32  Miljan, “The proposal to establish economic autonomy in Estonia”, 160.
33  James Gillies, Jaak Leimann, Rein Peterson, “Making a successful transition from 
a command to a market economy: the lessons from Estonia”, Corporate Governance, 3 
(2002), 175–186 (177).
34  Saar, “Iseolemise meeletu vaev”. 
35  Laar, “Suurte muutuste aeg”, 9.
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in all sectors except those connected to the military and transportation 
from January 1990 onwards, a decree that was issued jointly with a similar 
Lithuanian declaration in May 1989, the tiny Soviet republic took a giant 
leap towards full economic autonomy. 
The Nordic connection: investments, business cooperation and 
knowhow transfers across the Baltic Sea
With the adoption of the Decree on Joint Ventures, Moscow hoped to 
be able not only to attract Western capital, and thus much-needed hard 
currency, but also to invigorate the Soviet economy via the influx of new 
technologies and knowhow in market-oriented business practices. Hence, 
the expansion of economic relations with the West soon became a central 
feature of reform discourses, especially in the Baltic republics. The Toome 
government displayed vivid interest in attracting foreign direct investments 
and strongly promoted the further development of autonomous business 
relations with capitalist countries. With the establishment of the Estonian 
State Department for Foreign Economic Relations (Välismajandusamet) 
in March 1990, time-consuming registration procedures via Moscow were 
successfully omitted. Moreover, the Estonian government raised the limit 
of permitted foreign shares set in the 1987 Decree on Joint Ventures from 
49 to 99 percent, attracting a steadily increasing number of Western inves-
tors.36 As a result of these measures, Estonia was far ahead of all other 
Soviet republics in terms of registered joint ventures per capita.37 Tallinn 
was determined to use these channels to the West for the modernization 
of local industries and the increase of exports outside the Soviet market, 
which marked a significant turn away from the traditionally “export-averse 
but import-inclined” economic policies of the Soviet Union.38
36  “Estland beginnt, die zentrale Kommandowirtschaft abzuschaffen”, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 January 1990. 
37  The statistics of April 1989 show that Estonia featured one joint venture per 60,000 
inhabitants compared to the Soviet average of one company per 800,000 people. Liuhto, 
“Entrepreneurial transition in post-Soviet republics”, 122.
38  Philip Hanson, “The Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology after Stalin: 
some thoughts on people and connections”, Reassessing Cold War Europe, ed. by Sari 
Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (London and New York: Routledge 2011), 16–32 
(18). In the late 1980s, the economic exchange between Estonia and the countries of 
the European Community, for example, did not exceed 8 percent of Estonia’s exports. 
Alari Purju, “Makromajanduslik olukord Eestis aastatel 1990–1992”, Majandusreformid, 
13–19 (13).
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Although autonomous trade and business relations with the capital-
ist world played an increasingly prominent role in the Estonian economy, 
Prime Minister Indrek Toome remained sceptical of the agenda developed 
by the most radical faction of economists operating under the roof of the 
IME Council. Throughout his time in office, he supported a more cautious 
course of marketization promoted by the experts who had originally worked 
under the State Planning Committee and continued their activities under 
the leadership of the Committee’s former chairman Rein Otsason.39 After 
the succession of Toome by Edgar Savisaar, who had served as Minister 
of Economic Affairs for a brief period in early 1990, the Estonian govern-
ment staked out more ambitious aims. Savisaar’s government programme 
of May 1990 announced a “radical turn to the West” and a complex set of 
market-oriented reforms based on the maximalist vision of full emancipa-
tion from the Soviet domestic market.40 In view of the obvious stagnation 
and the weakening of the reform spirit in most Soviet republics, Savisaar 
frankly admitted that he considered the USSR to be a “developing coun-
try” that hampered efficient innovations in the fields of production, trade 
and business and, thus, jeopardized Estonia’s economic future.41 
The engineers of an autonomous Soviet Estonian trade policy focused 
first and foremost on developing closer relations with the Nordic neigh-
bour states, especially with Finland. Already in 1988, Estonian economists 
stressed the significance and assets of Estonia’s geographic location, high-
lighting the republic’s “organic belonging to the Nordic regional economic 
complex”.42 The Estonian SSR could indeed look back on more than two 
decades of autonomous trade and business relations with neutral Finland, a 
long-time “bilateral-settlement trade partner” of the Soviet Union.43 Strong 
historic ties, similar languages, the traditionally compliant stance of the 
Finnish government towards Moscow and, above all, a regular ferry con-
nection between Tallinn and Helsinki had facilitated the evolution of a lively 
39  Lillemets, “Indrek Toome – igal ajal esimene”, 13.
40  Savisaar’s government programme, published as a brochure entitled “Peaminister 
Edgar Savisaare valitsuse programm”, Tallinn, 16 May 1990: Museum of Estonians 
Abroad, Toronto (Väliseesti Muuseum, hereafter VEMU), f. 12, box 19:4, p. 24.
41  Edgar Savisaar, “Pööre Läände”, Äripäev, 19 February 1990. From 1988 onwards, 
Gorbachev took an increasingly “centrist” stance, moving closer to the faction of con-
servative communists as far as reforms in the economic sphere were concerned. Åslund, 
Gorbachev’s struggle for economic reform, 36.
42  Majanduslike välissidemete ja rahvusvahelise kooperatsiooni arendamine Eesti NSV 
rahvamajanduses (Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja Tehnikainformatsiooni ning Majandus-
uuringute Instituut, 1988), 9. 
43  Hanson, “The Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology after Stalin”, 18.
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contact network across the Gulf of Finland. Since the late 1960s, Finnish 
companies had been involved in a number of major construction projects 
in the Estonian SSR, the most famous of them being the Viru Hotel in Tal-
linn. Later on, Finnish investors developed a pronounced interest in produc-
ing goods for the Finnish market in Estonia, such as textiles and footwear. 
The multileveled cooperation between Estonia and Finland created a 
unique opening of the Soviet orbit to the capitalist world, a “window to the 
West” that gained even greater significance with the onset of perestroika. 
The increasing possibilities of cross-border economic cooperation trig-
gered new forms of commercial ventures. Hence, it was no coincidence 
that the first Soviet-Western joint venture was an Estonian-Finnish com-
pany that had grown out of an earlier Finnish investment project.44 These 
pre-existing contacts were also of vital importance for Finnish entrepre-
neurs. Due to their intimate knowledge of the Soviet market and upcom-
ing investment opportunities, Finnish enterprises were well-prepared when 
the Soviet Union opened up for joint ventures with Western companies. 
It is thus hardly surprising that the economic reform discourse and the 
work of the IME Council was followed with considerable interest in Fin-
land. Although the government, with good reason, refrained from offi-
cially supporting the increasingly radical economic claims of the Estonian 
reformers, Finnish media and business circles devoted much attention to 
the ongoing developments.45 
Although the influx of Finnish investments ensured access to West-
ern hard currency, the political establishment in Tallinn was aware of the 
fact that the close economic cooperation with Finland not always worked 
to Estonia’s advantage. The predominance of Finnish enterprises on the 
domestic market raised concerns about the lack of international compe-
tition.46 “The traditional partner has been Finland, but that should not be 
the limit, as the Finns take large profits,” as Savisaar, at the time still serv-
ing as Minister of Economic Affairs, stated in February 1990. Estonia’s 
business and trade relations with capitalist countries, he added, should 
be significantly expanded, particularly with Sweden.47 Not only Finnish, 
but also Swedish entrepreneurs had been following the unfolding events 
in the Baltic republics with increasing interest, not least due to the geo-
graphic proximity and Sweden’s close historical ties to the Baltic republics. 
44  Jaan Kabin, “Ühisettevõtete kaudu õppisime tegema nüüdisaegset äri”, Eesti ettevõt-
luse taassünd, 130–131 (130).
45  Interview with Made. 
46  Aimar Jugaste, “Majandussõnumid meilt ja mujalt”, Edasi, 26 January 1989.
47  Heikki Talving, “Teel turumajandusele”, Edasi, 25 February 1990.
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As Swedish Minister of Foreign Trade Anita Gradin told the press in 
autumn 1989, Estonia counted among Sweden’s “natural economic partners” 
together with her Baltic neighbour republics and the Leningrad oblast.48 
By then, a number of Swedish-Estonian joint ventures had already been 
established. On the whole, however, Sweden lacked the structural advan-
tage of pre-existing professional and personal networks which had helped 
investors from Finland to enter the Estonian market. Moreover, Finnish 
enterprises were better prepared for operating in Soviet-type economies 
due to their decade-long experience doing business with the USSR. Nev-
ertheless, Swedish investors were determined to catch up and to gain a 
foothold in the Baltic republics, which were seen as a strategic bridgehead 
into the vast Soviet market. After the Estonian Sovereignty Declaration of 
November 1988, which asserted the supremacy of republican legislation 
over the laws of the USSR, the Swedish Trade Council began to search for 
suitable contacts among entrepreneurs, trade organizations and the state 
bureaucracy in Estonia.49 For this purpose, the Trade Council, a self-gov-
erning institution that promoted Swedish exports on behalf of the govern-
ment and national industries, established a special section. The “Business 
Group Estonia” delivered advisory services to potential investors, medi-
ated between Swedish entrepreneurs and the emerging private business 
environment in Estonia and organized visits of business delegations in 
both directions. These activities were coordinated by a Swedish business 
consultant with Estonian roots, Toomas Käbin, who was also behind the 
establishment of the Trade Council’s communication point at the prem-
ises of the Swedish consulate in Tallinn in late 1989.50
The efforts to foster Swedish-Estonian business relations had visible 
effects, not least due to the pronounced interest of Estonian entrepreneurs 
in cooperating with Swedish partners.51 Swedish direct investments and 
the number of Swedish-Estonian joint ventures increased exponentially, 
48  “Baltimaadel on jaksu”, interview with Anita Gradin, Äripäev, 9 October 1989.
49  Internal working paper of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Political Department (Pol 1), 
on Swedish support for the Baltic states, 15 August 1991: Labour Movement Archives 
and Library, Stockholm (Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, hereafter ARAB), fond 
3164, box 2, p. 6.
50  “Rootsi konsultant”, Äripäev, 11 December 1989. In this respect, the Swedes were ahead 
of the Finns. It was first in early 1991 that the Finnish consulate in Tallinn employed a 
trade secretary to facilitate communication between Finnish and Estonian enterprises. 
Seppo Kervinen, “Helsingis asutati Soome-Eesti kaubandusühing”, Äripäev, 12–18 
December 1990. 
51  Väinu Rozental, “Põhjamaa liberaalid Eestis”, Edasi, 25 March 1989. 
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turning Sweden into a serious competitor to Finland on the Estonian mar-
ket.52 One of the factors that lay behind this boom was the foundation of 
Estonia’s first business newspaper, which had been established as a Swedish-
Estonian joint venture. 51 percent of the business was in the hands of the 
Bonnier Group, the owner of Sweden’s number one business daily Dagens 
Industri, while the rest of the shares belonged to the Estonian consulting 
and development company Mainor. The cooperation was based on the ini-
tiative of the Estonian émigré Tõnu Kerstell who had invited a delegation 
of Mainor representatives to Stockholm for consultations with Jacob Bon-
nier and Hasse Olsson, editor-in-chief of Dagens Industri.53 From October 
1989 onwards, the newspaper Äripäev, which appeared in the same layout 
as its Swedish template, turned into one of the major sources of informa-
tion about the rapidly unfolding changes in Estonia’s business environment 
and upcoming opportunities for cooperation with partners in capitalist 
countries, especially the Nordic states.
It was no coincidence that the earliest forms of Swedish-Estonian busi-
ness and trade cooperation were established with the help of Estonian émi-
grés. Sweden was one of the major strongholds of the Estonian diaspora, 
hosting tens of thousands of well-integrated and economically successful 
war refugees and their offspring. The remarkable commitment of Swed-
ish businessmen and economists with Estonian roots in promoting capital 
investment in Estonia certainly contributed to mitigating the initial res-
ervations of potential investors from Sweden. However, the significance 
of émigrés for the history of Estonia’s economic “Westernization” reached 
beyond their role as mediators. 
The traditionally anti-Soviet Estonian community in the West had 
been vigilantly following the unfolding of an Estonian nationalist agenda 
from afar. The issue of economic autonomy was vigorously discussed in 
the émigré press. Nevertheless, there was a wide-spread consensus to avoid 
any direct communication with official representatives of the occupation 
regime, an attitude that persisted up to the end of the 1980s. Many émigrés 
were highly suspicious of the intentions of the reformers. Instead of sup-
porting the course of the reform-minded Estonian government, a majority 
preferred to team up with the faction of radical nationalists who, led by for-
mer dissidents and political prisoners, promoted the restoration of pre-war 
52  By January 1990, 13 of Estonia’s 80 registered joint ventures were companies established 
with the participation of Swedish business partners. Heikki Talving, “Murranguaasta”, 
Äripäev, 15 January 1990.
53  Ülo Pärnits, ‘Mainor ja ettevõtluse areng Eestis”, Eesti ettevõtluse taassünd, 18–23 (20).
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sovereignty at an early stage. However, there were also more pragmatic 
attitudes towards the ongoing changes in Estonia among the ranks of the 
politically orthodox émigrés. Noteworthy in this context is a small trans-
atlantic community of highly successful businessmen and entrepreneurs 
who had followed the reform discourse with great interest. They were aware 
of the fact that Prime Ministers Toome and Savisaar knew significantly 
more about economics than the front figures of the secessionist camp who, 
due to their dissident background, had never been able to gather exper-
tise in the field.54 A good dose of political realism induced them to actively 
support the economic emancipation from Moscow as a less radical and, 
as they assumed, more realistic path towards greater national autonomy. 
The first embryonic networks between émigré experts and reform-
oriented circles in Estonia were based on coincidental personal encoun-
ters, a product of the liberalization of the Soviet travel regime from 1988 
onwards. The Swedish connection allegedly began at a basketball game, 
where Prime Minister Toome made the acquaintance of Swedish-Estonian 
business consultant Mart Nurk.55 This encounter inspired Toome to estab-
lish an economic think tank drawing on the economic expertise of émi-
gré advisors from Sweden. Nurk presented a list of potential candidates, 
among them prominent bankers, fiscal experts, entrepreneurs and engi-
neers.56 In 1989, the Swedish advisor group was officially established as the 
IME International Working Group and jointly led by Nurk and the banker 
Rudolf Jalakas. The émigré advisors were, as Nurk stated, eager to not pre-
sent ready-made action plans. Instead, they aimed to provide the govern-
ment and ministries with a variety of possible solutions which were devel-
oped in close consultation with colleagues and experts back in Sweden.57 
The model of recruiting external advisors proved advantageous for the 
formulation of an autonomous reform path towards a market-oriented 
economy. Hence, Prime Minister Savisaar followed the example of his 
predecessor. Soon after his appointment, the so-called International Eco-
nomic Advisory Board of the Prime Minister of Estonia commenced its 
work. The expert group was composed of Estonian émigrés not only from 
Sweden, but also from Canada, the United States, Australia, Germany, Bel-
gium and Venezuela. At the first board meeting on Tallinn’s Dome Hill in 
54  Interview with Prof. Igor Gräzin, Tartu University, carried out by Prof. Toivo Miljan, 
Wilfried Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada, 5 May 1990. VEMU, f. 12, b. 19:40, p. 8.
55  Interview with Jaak Leimann, Tallinn, 9 February 2015, in author’s possession.
56  Mart Nurk, “Ka rublaga saab palju asju korda ajada”, Äripäev, 4–10 June 1990.
57  Kaupo Pollisinski, “Suur visiit: majandustohtrid patsiente vaatamas”, Äripäev, 1–7 
May 1991.
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May 1990, the advisors thoroughly screened the governmental agenda and 
discussed the most urgent law projects on taxation, privatization, customs, 
foreign trade and the introduction of an Estonian currency with Savisaar 
and his ministers.58 A series of smaller seminars followed, tailored to the 
individual fields of expertise of the members of the Advisory Board.59 Sub-
sequent board meetings took place three or four times a year. They were 
organized by Minister of Economic Affairs Jaak Leimann and Mehis Pilv, 
the director of the Estonian State Department for Foreign Economic Con-
tacts.60 Toome’s expert group continued to operate, although most of its 
members were simultaneously active in the Advisory Board, which pri-
marily dealt with theoretical questions, analysing economic legislation in 
various Western countries in order to formulate drafts for an Estonian legal 
framework. By contrast, the IME International Working Group focused 
on individual law projects, especially in the fields of taxation, finance and 
banking, and conducted macroeconomic analyses.61
Savisaar’s Advisory Board significantly contributed to deepening the 
Estonian leadership’s knowledge about the ways in which capitalist econo-
mies functioned in a global perspective. The Canadian faction in particu-
lar showed remarkable commitment to the cause of Estonia’s economic 
transformation, especially Toronto-based businessman Ilmar Martens 
who, together with Madis Habakuk, director of the Estonian Management 
Institute, founded Estonia’s first private business school in Tallinn in 1988.62 
On the other hand, due to their geographic proximity, the émigrés from 
Sweden were better connected among Estonia’s economic elites, a fact that 
increased their direct and indirect leverage on the Estonian reform path. 
During his first months in office, Savisaar approached Rudolf Jalakas, who 
had already advised the Toome government on banking-related matters, 
with the request of recruiting a Swedish expert willing to assist the Esto-
nian government in the development of a set of banking laws. Jalakas pro-
posed Bo Kragh as a suitable advisor, the vice president of Handelsbanken, 
a major Swedish bank where Jalakas himself held a leading position. Kragh 
had worked in Moscow for several years and was also well-informed about 
Estonian issues due to an earlier cooperation with the Tartu Commercial 
Bank (Tartu Kommertspank), which had been established as the Soviet 
58  “Mitu pead on parem kui üks”, Äripäev, 28 May – 4 June 1990.
59  Interview with Leimann.
60  Edgar Savisaar, Peaminister. Eesti lähiajalugu 1990–1992 (Tartu: Kleio, 2004), 149. 
61  Mart Nurk, “Ka rublaga saab palju asju korda ajada”. 
62  Ene-Liis Martens, Ilmar: his story (Collingwood, ON: McNulty Printing, 2014), 168–69; 
Paavo Kangur, “Ärikoolituse teerajaja”, Eesti ettevõtluse taassünd, 166–168.
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Union’s first commercial bank in autumn 1988. After a series of negotia-
tions between Prime Minister Savisaar and Handelsbanken, the Swedes 
agreed to send Kragh to Estonia for a couple of months, covering the sal-
ary costs for the duration of his stay.63 From the beginning onwards, the 
Swedish banker strongly supported the transfer of the entire banking sec-
tor into the hands of the Estonian government as a precondition for the 
creation of an independent economy. He supervised several expert groups 
working on this set of problems and related issues, such as the establish-
ment of a foreign trade system, state deposits of foreign currencies and the 
introduction of the Estonian kroon.64 As Savisaar claims, the contribution 
of Kragh was significant for the monetary reform process and had a long-
term learning effect for the political elites in Tallinn. For the first time, the 
decision-making process proceeded, as Savisaar put it, in a “Western” way. 
Moreover, up to the restoration of independence in August 1991, Kragh 
remained the Estonian government’s only official Western advisor.65
The dynamics of Estonia’s autonomous economic cooperation with 
partners from capitalist countries illustrates the remarkable determina-
tion of the Toome and Savisaar governments to take advantage of the vari-
ous opportunities that gradually opened up from 1988 onwards. Informal 
cooperation with Western investors and economic advisors developed 
into a widely ramified set of economic relations outside the Soviet Union. 
Joint ventures and import/export agreements were concluded with inves-
tors and companies from Finland, Sweden and Norway, but also from 
West Germany, Switzerland and Canada. Finland and Sweden were thus 
by far not the only Western countries with which Estonian state bureau-
crats, economists and entrepreneurs cooperated. However, the tightly knit 
professional and personal networks across the Baltic Sea consolidated the 
63  Savisaar, Peaminister, 313. 
64  Aavo Kokk, “Svenska Handelsbanken on abitanud ka Leninit”, Edasi, 21 September 
1990. 
65  Savisaar, Peaminister, 545–546. Of course, Sweden was not the only source of economic 
knowhow for the Estonian government before the restoration of independence. Both 
Savisaar and Leimann repeatedly mentioned their numerous private consultations with 
Finnish entrepreneurs and economic leaders, and the North American connection also 
played a crucial role. The chairman of the Bank of Finland Esko Ollila, to mention one 
example, offered numerous useful advice to political key figures in Estonia, but figured, 
out of necessity, as a private citizen in his efforts to support the Estonian economic 
reform path, see Heikki Rausmaa, Kultuuri sildi all saab üsna palju ära teha: Soome ja 
Eesti poliitilised suhted 1988. aasta kevadest diplomaatiliste suhete sõlmimiseni 1991. aasta 
augustis (Tallinn: Argo, 2015), 170–171. Sweden’s Handelsbanken, however, was the only 
Western institution with which the Estonian government set up an official agreement 
in the field of expert consultancy before autumn 1991.
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dominant position of the Nordic neighbour states in Estonia’s nascent 
business environment at an early stage. The close cooperation with Fin-
land and Sweden thus significantly accelerated the Estonian marketization 
process, not only via the influx of innovative technologies and Western 
capital through bilateral joint ventures. Knowhow transfers between the 
Nordic states and Estonia were equally important for the Soviet republic’s 
early economic transformation, not only for the key decision-makers in 
Tallinn. For the most part, the economic elites at least had an idea about 
the mechanisms of market economies and Western business practices. By 
contrast, the new emerging cast of private businessmen who, as Estonia’s 
first entrepreneurs, were supposed to play a key role in translating the tran-
sitional “changes in the macroeconomic environment into corresponding 
microeconomic behaviour”,66 were usually unfamiliar with virtually every 
aspect of managing a company and operating in an international, market-
driven environment. 
Even a planned economy had to care for the education of its managers 
and enterprise directors. The professional training of managerial cadres was 
thus not new to Soviet economists. In the Estonian SSR, the Estonian Man-
agement Institute and the consulting and development company Mainor 
had become central institutions in this field.67 Due to Estonia’s status as a 
laboratory for Soviet market experiments, since the mid-1960s, local eco-
nomic elites had been able to establish limited academic exchange with 
foreign specialists. During the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Ministry of Higher 
Education sent hundreds of Soviet researchers and economists abroad for 
professional education. Among them were also several top economists from 
the Estonian SSR who were offered additional training both in the satellite 
countries and the capitalist West. Centres of specialized expertise in the 
field of managerial training thus developed more or less synchronically in 
both Moscow and in Tallinn.68 
66  Andrzej Kozmiński quoted in Liuhto, “Entrepreneurial transition in post-Soviet 
republics”, 137.
67  Laos, Mainori lugu, 87.
68  In the Estonian SSR, there were four institutions where Western managerial practices 
were intensively discussed from the Brezhnev era onwards: the Tallinn Polytechnic 
Institute, the Estonian Management Institute, Mainor and the Department of Econom-
ics at Tartu State University. In the field of enterprise management, Estonia was thus 
ahead of most Soviet republics, including its Baltic neighbours Latvia and Lithuania, 
when Gorbachev’s perestroika set in. Madis Habakuk, “Habakuk näitab uusi linnu”, 
Jäljed, 150–164 (153, 159). It was certainly no coincidence that the first U.S.-Soviet joint 
conference on business management was coordinated by Mainor and held in Tallinn 
in 1977. Laos, Mainori lugu, 53.
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The core tasks of enterprise managers in a Western market economy 
and a Soviet-type command economy were essentially not that different. 
However, the practices in the fields of accounting, financing and bank-
ing issues had to be fundamentally reformed in the transforming econ-
omy of late-Soviet Estonia, while marketing as a concept was still largely 
unknown.69 Hence, managerial training and post-graduate education in 
Western business practices boomed years before Estonia actually became 
a fully-fledged market economy. Various Western business schools estab-
lished cooperation programmes with Estonian institutions from 1988 
onwards, such as the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C., the Trade Man-
agement Institute in Blackrock near Dublin, and Enterprise York at York 
University in Toronto. However, due to the geographic proximity and the 
quickly developing personal networks, Finland and Sweden turned into 
the major points of reference as far as the professional training of the first 
generation of Estonian capitalists was concerned. 
Early on in the Estonian reform debate, leading economic experts 
pointed out the need to educate qualified managers in order to integrate 
Estonia’s developing entrepreneurial sector into international and global 
markets.70 The importance ascribed to professional education was also 
reflected in Prime Minister Savisaar’s governmental programme, which 
clearly stated that “the government sees its major role in the support of 
schooling and training programmes for entrepreneurs and in facilitat-
ing the development of international entrepreneurial contacts”.71 It was, 
again, the decade-long institutionalized cooperation with Finnish experts 
that significantly contributed to raising managerial training in Estonia to 
Western standards. “Learning from the Finns” had long been the motto 
of scientific-technical collaboration between Finland and the USSR, which 
already in 1955 signed an agreement on bilateral cooperation that covered 
twenty different areas of science and technology by 1970.72
As Madis Habakuk remembers, the director of the Central Commit-
tee’s Department for Science and Technology and the Vice-Chairman of 
the Soviet Estonian Council of Ministers first established contact with Mec 
69  Jaak Leimann, “Täiskasvanuharidus ja riigi areng”, Jäljed, 119–134 (121).
70  Majanduslike välissidemete ja rahvusvahelise kooperatsiooni arendamine, 11.
71  “Peaminister Edgar Savisaare valitsuse programm”, 18.
72  Tatiana Androsova, “Economic interest in Soviet post-war policy on Finland”, Reas-
sessing Cold War Europe, 33–48 (35); Sampsa Kaataja, “Expert groups closing the divide: 
Estonian-Finnish computing cooperation since the 1960s”, Beyond the divide: entangled 
histories of Cold War Europe, ed. by Simo Mikkonen, Pia Koivunen (New York and 
Oxford: Berghahn, 2015), 101–120 (104).
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Rastor, one of Finland’s leading consulting companies, already in the early 
1970s.73 Finnish experts in the field were well educated in American man-
agement practices, but had adapted them to local conditions and Finnish 
culture, which made their expertise very attractive for Estonia. Western 
concepts such as human resources, personnel and enterprise management 
thus reached Estonia at an early stage, in particular through Mainor. Main-
or’s academic director Jaak Leimann, who himself had spent almost a year 
in Finland in the mid-1970s and maintained contact with his colleagues 
across the Gulf, regularly organized joint seminars with Mec Rastor and 
management training centres such as the Porvoo-based company Lifim 
and the Ekonomiliitoo Koulutuksen Keskus in Kuopio.74 These institu-
tional contacts expanded with the formulation of an autonomous Estonian 
reform agenda. One of the major bilateral projects in the field of manage-
rial training was the Finnish-Estonian joint venture MainorFin, established 
by Mainor and the Finnish consulting firm Omatulos in November 1988.75 
The company successfully trained a new generation of Estonian manag-
ers with Finnish money, while it simultaneously offered seminars on pere-
stroika and Baltic economic reforms in both Finland and Sweden in order 
to inform potential investors about the ongoing developments.76 Finnish 
enterprises, on the other hand, sent their employees to MainorFin in Tal-
linn for training purposes, hoping that direct personal encounters would 
generate valuable first-hand information on investment opportunities.77 
State-sponsored and private consulting firms in Estonia also benefited 
from the connection to Sweden. From 1988 onwards, Swedish-Estonian 
economists, entrepreneurs and bankers were frequent guests at the Esto-
nian Management Institute’s lecture series, organized under the name 
EMI International by the institute’s director Jaak Leimann, who had left 
his post at Mainor a year earlier.78 A number of émigrés, among them the 
Stockholm-based businessman Ilmar Roostal, who later joined Savisaar’s 
Advisory Board, started their own professional training programmes for 
Estonian entrepreneurs. In close cooperation with Mainor, Roostal’s com-
pany Baltic Development Group AB frequently invited Estonian delegations 
73  Habakuk, “Habakuk näitab uusi linnu”, 153. 
74  Laos, Mainori lugu, 88.
75  Peeter Raidla, “Ärikoolituse annab Mainorfin”, Äripäev, 13 November 1989.
76  Pärnits, “Mainor ja ettevõtluse areng Eestis”, 20.
77  Laos, Mainori lugu, 228. 
78  Tiit Elenurm, “Eesti Majandusjuhtide Instituut”, Jäljed, 183–189 (186–187); “Moodne 
majandusliku kontrolli ja juhtimise süsteem Rootsist”, Äripäev, 26–31 March 1990; 
Interview with Erik Terk, Tallinn, 12 February 2015, in author’s possession. 
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to Sweden in order to illustrate how Swedish enterprises functioned in 
practice.79 Another example of émigré activity in the field was the Market 
Economy Centre, established in Tallinn in June 1990 by the prominent 
Estonian activist Andres Küng from Malmö and his Estonian business 
partner. The joint venture, which was partly financed by the Swedish state, 
was founded on the initiative of Swedish entrepreneurs and aimed at sup-
porting the economic reform agenda in Estonia.80 Together with its Swed-
ish partner institutions, the Swedish Association of Free Entrepreneurs and 
the Commerce and Industry Fund, the Centre organized regular seminars 
and lectures by Swedish businessmen and politicians in Tallinn, as well as 
smaller events for entrepreneurs in the Estonian countryside. Moreover, 
the Market Economy Centre offered traineeships in Sweden and additional 
training for university lecturers in the field of economics at the Stockholm 
School of Economics.81 From autumn 1990 onwards, the official coopera-
tion with Swedish institutions significantly expanded when organizations 
such as the Swedish Institute for Corporate Development and the Swedish 
National Industrial Board started to invite Estonian ministry employees 
and business leaders to Sweden for training purposes.82 
When the Nordic Council presented its official budgetary plan for 
supporting the Baltic republics in the fields of professional training and 
regional development in early 1991,83 the informal cooperation between 
Estonia’s economic elites and their partners in Stockholm and Helsinki 
was already in full swing. From spring 1990 onwards, communication 
with Swedish ministries had been developing without any interference 
from Moscow. Estonia behaved like an independent state and the Swed-
ish government did not show any inclination to hamper the official dia-
logue as long as it was restricted to economic and environmental issues.84 
It goes without saying that Finland was much more careful in handling the 
issue. Any form of economic cooperation with Estonia, which increasingly 
claimed not only economic but also political sovereignty, was organized 
via the Finnish Trade Council, consulting companies or business schools 
79  Interview with Mehis Pilv, Tallinn, 11 February 2015, in author’s possession.
80  Kalev Vilgats, “Tallinna Turumajanduse Keskus avatud”, Edasi, 21 June 1990.
81  Peeter Luksep, “Rootsi ärielu asutas Tallinna turumajandusinstituuti”, Äripäev, 4–10 
July 1990.
82  Aivi Ross, “SIND alustas Eestist”, Edasi, 8 November 1990; Aivi Ross, “Õppiv ja 
õpetav Rootsi”, Edasi, 29 November 1990.
83  Tõnis Arnover, “Põhjamaade Baltikumi programm”, Äripäev, 20–26 March 1991.
84  Interview with Terk.
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and not the ministries.85 However, these were only formal issues. Cooper-
ation in the fields of business and trade, educational exchange and a large 
variety of smaller, regional cooperation projects between Estonia on the 
one hand and Finland and Sweden on the other flourished by the turn of 
the decade. The lively networking activities of the crucial period between 
1987 and 1991 thus illustrate the fundamental difference between formal 
and informal policies, shedding light on the ambiguity of the Swedish 
and Finnish stance vis-à-vis the Baltic struggle for greater autonomy and, 
eventually, independence. 
Conclusion
Summing up the progress of the disintegrating Soviet Union’s attempts 
to fundamentally reform the planned economy system half a decade after 
Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party, Swedish economist Anders Åslund did not mince his words. The sen-
ior advisor to Boris Yeltsin’s reform government dismissed perestroika as a 
“miserable economic failure”.86 This verdict might indeed be appropriate to 
describe the failed attempts of implementing market-oriented reforms in 
most Soviet republics, not least in Russia proper, where attempts to reform 
the ailing economy were stifled by the harsh ideological resistance among 
broad sections of society and the Party nomenklatura. Estonia, by contrast, 
is a textbook example of how the incentives created by Gorbachev’s ambi-
tious agenda of far-reaching systemic transformation could be translated 
into a set of coherent and path-breaking market reforms. The establishment 
of sovereign economic institutions and the development of an innovative 
economic legislation on the republican level triggered what in hindsight 
turned out to be early state-building processes that largely predetermined 
Estonia’s post-1991 economic performance. The restoration of sovereign 
statehood in August 1991 was thus far from being an “hour zero”, at least in 
economic terms. Indeed, it was only one of the milestones in the evolution 
85  Heikki Rausmaa illustrates the cautious attitude of Finnish ministries in his rich 
and fascinating account of informal Finnish-Estonian relations in the years prior to 
the restoration of Estonia’s independence. From spring 1989 onwards, the Association 
of Finnish Agriculture played a central role as a donator of technological and financial 
help aimed at supporting agricultural reforms in Estonia. The Ministry for Agriculture 
and Forestry was well informed about the regular donations and the traineeship pro-
grammes organized for Estonians on Finnish farms, but carefully avoided to make its 
support for this type of bilateral cooperation official. Rausmaa, Kultuuri sildi all saab 
üsna palju ära teha, 63.
86  Åslund, Gorbachev’s struggle for economic reform, 1.
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of a series of “inter-related, focused policies planned by individual Estoni-
ans and enacted by various Estonian governments since the mid-1980s”.87 
First cautious experiments with self-management and semi-private 
forms of entrepreneurship marked the beginning of a process that devel-
oped into what comes close to an economic revolution. Nevertheless, the 
dynamic reform agenda was ultimately unable to fundamentally transform 
the basis of late-Soviet Estonia’s economy. Up to the restoration of inde-
pendence in August 1991, Estonia was still largely stuck in the structural 
limitations set by the planned economy system. It was mainly the lack of 
macroeconomic stabilization that hampered the efficient implementation 
of the detailed action plans that had been drawn up by the economic task 
forces established by the subsequent governments of Toome and Savisaar. 
During the last years of Soviet rule, the Estonians thus rather lived, as one 
of the Swedish émigré advisors put it, “in two systems at the same time”.88 
Nevertheless, the crucial “stage of reconstruction in the sense of construct-
ing a new system”, described by historian Archie Brown as the “transition 
from Communism”,89 had already been reached when Estonia eventu-
ally re-entered the community of independent states. The groundwork of 
hundreds of economic experts and advisors, accomplished between 1987 
and 1991, turned out to have a long-lasting impact. In fact, the majority of 
the laws and decrees on Estonia’s transition to a market-driven economy 
were adopted before August 1991, paving the way for the quick and effi-
cient marketization of independent Estonia’s trade, business and economic 
policies.90 Much of Estonia’s impressive post-1991 economic performance, 
which earned the small republic the name “Baltic tiger”, can thus be traced 
back to “Savisaar’s vision of an economically prosperous independent state” 
that guided Tallinn’s economic policies in the last years of Soviet rule.91
Estonia’s exceptional exposure to Western influences, which was rooted 
in the resumption of autonomous cultural and economic relations with 
neutral Finland in the mid-1960s, turned into an invaluable asset that 
87  Gillies, Leimann, Peterson, “Making a successful transition from a command to a 
market economy”, 175.
88  Pollisinski, “Suur visiit: majandustohtrid patsiente vaatamas”.
89  Archie Brown, “Transnational influences in the transition from communism”, 
Working Paper, 273 (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2000), 3, 6.
90  Some experts even argue that the government of Mart Laar, which was established 
in October 1992 and took most of the credit for Estonia’s remarkable economic success, 
did not introduce a single economic reform that was essentially new, see Aavo Kokk, 
“Esimese valitsuse programm”, Majandusreformid, 27–29 (27).
91  Historical dictionary of Estonia, ed. by Toivo Miljan (Lanham et al.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2nd edn, 2015), 409. 
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influenced nascent marketization processes before 1991 to a significant 
degree. Gorbachev’s policy of economic decentralization and his willing-
ness to turn to Western models for inspiration paved the way for dynamic 
cross-border transfers of knowhow in the fields of macroeconomics, entre-
preneurship and management. “Economic linkage” to the West, as political 
scientists define cross-border flows of investments, credits, bilateral and 
multilateral aid and trade relations,92 was thus established before the res-
toration of independence provided the structural preconditions for Esto-
nia to become a fully-fledged market economy. Estonian state bureaucrats, 
scholars and entrepreneurs displayed a remarkable ability to forge alliances 
with Western partners and advisors, drawing in particular on the struc-
tural advantages of pre-existing networks and the vital interest of potential 
investors in nearby Finland and Sweden. The Estonian case thus reaffirms 
the significance of geographic proximity as the “most important source of 
western linkage”.93
The Nordic connection was a factor that accelerated the process of Esto-
nia’s economic “Westernization” at an early stage and significantly contrib-
uted to cementing the Baltic republic’s pioneering role among the trans-
forming economies in post-socialist Europe. However, it should be noted 
that the transfer of knowhow and economic ideas via numerous bilateral 
cooperation projects did not develop along the lines of imitating specific 
patterns of economic governance. In contrast to the assumption that cul-
tural kinship and the heritage of shared histories facilitate the transfer 
of political and economic models in transformation and state-building 
processes,94 Estonia’s path to capitalism eventually featured a radical-
ism that is much closer to North American patterns. Indeed, the Nordic 
package of market socialism and extensive government intervention was 
considered an ideal to strive for by Estonia’s political and economic elites 
prior to the secession from the USSR.95 However, in view of Sweden and 
Finland’s aggravating economic crisis caused by stagnating production, 
budget deficits and double-digit consumer inflation in the early 1990s, 
the Nordic economies quickly lost their role model function, not only in 
92  Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, “Linkage versus leverage: rethinking the international 
dimension of regime change”, Comparative Politics, 38:4 (2006), 379–400 (383). 
93  Ibid., 384. 
94  Stephen Shulman, “National identity and public support for political and economic 
reform in Ukraine”, Slavic Review, 64:1 (2005), 59–87 (67). 
95  Tiit Pruuli, “Andres Küng Eesti poliitikutega saunas”, Edasi, 23 November 1989.
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Estonia, but throughout post-socialist Europe.96 This, however, does not 
contradict the hypothesis that the early transnational linkages with Fin-
land and Sweden were decisive for Estonia’s successful reintegration into 
Western markets and transformation into a functioning market economy 
after the restoration of independence. 
Early entrance into the Estonian market turned out to be an invalu-
able asset for both Finnish and Swedish investors. Their advantage over 
competitors from other parts of Western Europe and overseas was rooted 
not only in geography, but also in the “bilateral openness and trust” that 
characterized their professional networks with Estonian partners.97 Long-
established personal and professional bonds between economic experts 
on both sides of the Gulf of Finland and pre-existing business relations 
between Finnish and Estonian companies cemented Finland’s dominant 
position among Estonia’s foreign trade partners. Up to early 1989, Esto-
nia’s economic cooperation with capitalist countries was de facto limited 
to Finland, whereas the links to Sweden had only started to develop.98 
The Swedish connection lacked the decade-long personal networks which 
considerably facilitated economic cooperation between Finland and Esto-
nia. Nevertheless, this strategic disadvantage could be compensated for in 
part by the kin networks of mutual trust established by Estonian émigrés. 
They played a crucial role as mediators between Swedish institutions and 
potential investors on the one hand and Estonian cooperation partners on 
the other, which triggered a rise in Swedish economic activity in the small 
Baltic republic. While Sweden accounted for 9 percent of all foreign direct 
investment in Estonia in January 1991, the Swedish share had risen to 32 
percent only ten months later.99 The pioneering engagement of Finns and 
96  John F. L. Ross, “Sweden, the European Community, and the politics of economic 
realism”, Cooperation and Conflict, 26:3 (1991), 117–128 (123). 
97  Ainius Lasas, “External engagement: the Baltic experience”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 
35:4 (2004), 360–377 (373). According to sociologist Tõnu Parming, it was especially soft 
factors such as historical and cultural ties that rendered “business investments, foreign 
formal aid [and] people-to-people assistance” from Finland and Sweden far more effi-
cient than in the cases of Latvia and Lithuania. Tõnu Parming, The Baltic countries: 
between a rock and a hard place, typed manuscript, 1993. VEMU, f. 48, b. 12B:30, p. 23. 
98  Aimar Jugaste, “Majandussõnumid meilt ja mujalt”, Edasi, 26 January 1989. However, 
only one year later, the situation had changed. In late 1990, only 117 out of 228 registered 
Estonian-Western joint ventures had been established with Finnish companies. Rausmaa, 
Kultuuri sildi all saab üsna palju ära teha, 237.
99  The Finnish shares were 25 and 22 percent respectively. Kari Liuhto, The entrepre-
neurial and management cultural transformation in independent Estonia, dissertation 
(University of Glasgow, Institute of Russian and East European Studies, 1996), 283, 
<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2075> (accessed 8 June 2016).
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Swedes in the nascent business environment of the Estonian SSR secured 
both countries an uncontested position among independent Estonia’s trade 
and business partners, which was reflected in the fact that 75 percent of all 
foreign direct investment came from these two countries in 1993.100 Even 
in the field of foreign trade and business relations, the “micro foundations 
of the new economic order” had thus been laid before secession from the 
USSR became a realistic political option.101 Hence, when the first consult-
ants of the International Monetary Fund arrived to Estonia in November 
1991, the political and economic elites of the newly independent country 
were neither novices to the mechanisms and practices of market econo-
mies, nor did they lack professional and business networks in the West. 
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Kokkuvõte: Majanduse integreerimine Läände: Eesti 
turumajanduse käivitajad ja nende Põhjamaade partnerid 
Nõukogude Liidu lõpuaastatel
Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemisele eelnenud nn laulva revolutsiooni 
perioodi on käsitletud arvukates humanitaar- ja sotsiaalteaduslikes 
uurimustes. Põhiline tähelepanu on aga seni keskendunud Balti riikide 
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iseseisvumispüüdluste poliitilistele aspektidele. Põhjalikult on uuritud rah-
vusliku liikumise esiletõusmisega seotud sündmusi, nagu näiteks kalend-
ridemonstratsioonid, mis vallandasid arutelu 1940. aasta anneksiooni 
ebaseaduslikkuse üle, ja iseseisvust pooldava poliitilise massiliikumise 
kujunemine. Paralleelselt arenesid aga protsessid, mille roll riigi ülesehi-
tamisse oli tagantjärele vaadates samuti väga oluline, kuid mida on siiani 
palju vähem uuritud.
Balti teadlased ja eksperdid arutasid elavalt majandusliku iseseisvuse 
kontseptsiooni, mis tugines vabariigi isemajandamisele, Nõukogude Liidu 
siseste kaubandussuhete ulatuslikule reorganiseerimisele ja avanemisele 
välisturgudele, juba aastaid enne, kui poliitilise eraldumise võimaluse 
üle avalikult kõnelda sai. Majanduslike ümberkorralduste plaanid, mida 
arendati ja testiti, olid välja kasvanud perestroika uuendusmeelsusest, 
kuid olid kohandatud kohaliku tööstuse ja põllumajanduse nõuetele ning 
võimekusele. Pole kahtlust, et käsitlused majandusliku suveräänsuse ning 
liiduvabariikide ressursside ja riiklike ettevõtete kohalikust haldamisest 
valmistasid ette pinnast, millelt said tuge ka kasvavad poliitilise autonoo-
mia nõudmised. 
Moskva jõupingutused reformimaks Nõukogude majandust võeti vastu 
entusiastlikult, eriti Eesti NSV-s, mis oli olnud Kremli lemmikuks katse-
jäneseks erinevate majanduslike eksperimentide läbiviimisel juba hilisest 
Hruštšovi ajast. Eesti kujunes peagi Nõukogude Liidus turumajanduse üle 
peetavate debattide suunajaks. Eestlaste ideed said märkimisväärse polii-
tilise mõõtme pärast nn IME-ettepaneku avaldamist ajalehes Edasi 1987. 
aasta septembris. Väljend “peremehetunne” sai Nõukogude Eesti ajakir-
janduses sageli esinevaks juhtmõtteks ning mõjutas ka Vaino Väljase ja 
Edgar Savisaare valitsuste majanduspoliitikat, mille raames töötati välja 
üha radikaalsemaid turumajanduslikke programme. Eesti juhtivate uuen-
dusmeelsete majandusteadlaste “radikaalne pööre Läände” ei jäänud tähe-
lepanuta ka Lääne investoritele ja ettevõtetele, kes nägid Balti vabariikides 
sissepääsu ääretule Nõukogude Liidu turule.
1987. aasta määrus välismaiste partneritega ühisettevõtete loomise kohta 
lõi uusi koostöövõimalusi Nõukogude Eesti ettevõtete ja Lääne investorite 
vahel. Sellele järgnenud väliskapitali ja haldus- ning ettevõtlusalase oskus-
teabe sissevool oli stardipauguks viljakale koostööle ühelt poolt Eesti refor-
mijate ja teiselt poolt Lääne ärimeeste, konsultantide, majandusteadlaste jt 
vahel. Kuigi piiriülene koostöö arenes algselt juba toimivate sidemete tõttu 
naaberriigi Soomega, laienesid peatselt majanduslikud kontaktid ka muu 
läänemaailmaga ja seda paljuski väliseesti majandusteadlaste ja ettevõtjate 
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abil. Viimased mängisid võtmerolli ka suhtevõrgustiku arendamisel üha 
enam rahvuslikult meelestatud Eesti NSV eliidi ja Rootsi investorite ja eks-
pertide vahel. Emigrandid tegid edukat lobitööd Rootsist investeeringute 
saamiseks ja juurutasid turumajanduslikku mõtlemist, olles nõuandjateks 
nii Eesti valitsusele kui ka organiseerides vajalikke koolitusi esimeste Eesti 
ettevõtjate väljaõpetamiseks. Nende kaasamine moodustas tugivõrgustiku 
selgroo, mis hoogustas märkimisväärselt nõudmisi riiklikuks iseseisvu-
miseks ja valmistas ette pinda efektiivse desovetiseerimise agenda tekkeks 
pärast 1991. aastat. 
Rekonstrueerides vastasmõjusid ja protsesse vasttärganud ärikeskkonna 
ning Rootsi ja Soome majanduse vahel, anname senistele Põhjamaade 
Balti poliitika käsitlustele uue dimensiooni. Majandus on oluline aspekt, 
mõistmaks neutraliteedipoliitikat ajavate Põhjala riikide mõju Balti riiki-
dele kriitilistel 1987.–91. aastatel. Kuigi Eesti heitis lõpuks Põhjala sotsiaal-
turumajandusliku mudeli kõrvale, oli Läänemereülestel võrgustikel pika-
ajaline mõju riigi majanduspoliitika kujunemisele. Makroökonoomika-, 
ettevõtluse- ja juhtimisalaste teadmiste maaletoomine aitas kaasa kiirele 
majandusreformide läbiviimisele ja suunas Eesti poliitilise ja majandus-
liku eliidi kindlalt turumajanduse kursile. 
